Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 3

March 1986

Pornography: Social Science, Legal, and Clinical Perspectives
Edward Donnerstein
Cheryl A. Champion
Cass R. Sunstein
Catharine A. MacKinnon

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawandinequality.org/
Recommended Citation
Edward Donnerstein, Cheryl A. Champion, Cass R. Sunstein & Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography:
Social Science, Legal, and Clinical Perspectives, 4(1) LAW & INEQ. 17 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol4/iss1/3

Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

Pornography: Social Science, Legal, and
Clinical Perspectives
Panel Presenters
Edward Donnerstein
Ph.D. in Psychology, Professor, The Center for Communications Research, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Cheryl A. Champion
Coordinator, Sexual Assault Intervention and Treatment Services, Human Services,
Inc., Oakdale, Minnesota.

Cass R. Sunstein
Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

Catharine A. MacKinnon
Visiting Scholar, Stanford Law School.

Pornography and the First Amendment:
What Does the Social Science Research Say?
Edward Donnerstein*
Some of the recent major findings in the area of pornography, in particular areas of aggressive pornography, are relevant,
particularly to those of you who are trial judges, because they deal
with effects of sexually violent material on jury decision making in
rape trials.
Initially, I would like to mention one book which I think is
quite helpful, by Neil Malamuth and myself, called Pornography
and Sexual Aggression ,1 which deals with most of the current experimental research on the effects of pornography, in this country
and abroad. A number of chapters deal with cross-cultural research on the effects of pornography and mass media violence.
The book also includes some very interesting cross-national studies
by Larry Baron and Murray Straus dealing with the availability of
certain types of pornographic magazines and the incidents of rape
* Professor Donnerstein has done extensive research in the area of human
aggression on media effects on behavior and attitudes and research on the effects of
pornography and mass media violence.
1. Pornography and Sexual Aggression (Neil Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds. 1984).
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on a state by state basis. 2 Most significant, however, are two chapters dealing with legal issues, written by a lawyer and a psychologist. One chapter deals with constitutional law3 and the other with
tort liability.4
Those of us who do research in the area of sexual violence
look at different types of sexually violent material. The first type

of material is called aggressive or violent pornography. It has received the most research and is the subject of little academic dispute since it has the most consistent and reliable research findings.
To put it into context, this material is considered X-rated, which
may connote certain meanings. It also contains various forms of
aggression, including many rape scenes, primarily against women.
Sometimes the aggression is quite graphic and violent, but
what is particularly interesting about violent pornography is something we call a theme of, for lack of a better word, enjoyment.
This means that whenever a woman is raped, sexually assaulted,
or aggressed against in some manner, one can rest assured that by
the end of the film, she will be turned on and find some type of
pleasure and enjoyment from this violence.
The message that violent acts are pleasurable for women is
very common in this type of material. One should recognize, however, that it is quite pervasive throughout the media. This is exemplified by an advertisement in Time magazine for "A Death in
California," a television show with Sam Elliot and Cheryl Ladd.5
The headlines and promos were "he raped her, he killed her fiance, but she loved him." That message comes out a great deal in
the media but is even more prominent in violent pornography.
I would like to discuss some of the effects of this especially
violent material. In the last few years researchers have focused
upon three or four areas dealing with exposure to these types of
images. One area concerns sexual arousal.
The research on convicted rapists has shown that they find
violent forms of pornography sexually arousing. 6 For many rapists
these types of materials are more sexually arousing than depic2. Larry Baron & Murray A. Straus, Sexual Stratification, Pornography,and
Rape in the United States, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra note 1, at

186.
3. See Steven Penrod & Daniel Linz, Using PsychologicalResearch on Violent
Pornography to Inform Legal Change, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression,

supra note 1, at 247.
4. See Daniel Linz, Charles W. Turner, Bradford W. Hesse & Steven Penrod,
Bases of Liability for Injuries Produced by Media Portrayalsof Violent Pornogra-

phy, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra note 1, at 277.
5. Time, May 13, 1985, at 11.

6. Gene G. Abel, David H. Harlow, Edward B. Blanchard & Donald Guild, The
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tions of mutually consenting adult heterosexual activity. In fact,
some research indicates that a rapist's level of violent and sadistic
behavior can be determined by his degree of sexual arousal upon
7
viewing sexually violent images.
For many years it was assumed that only men who commit
sexual crimes found such images sexually arousing. Recent research by Neil Malamuth and others indicates that even "normal"
males are aroused by images of rape, particularly where the victim
becomes aroused or finds pleasure.8 Significantly, many males in
the "normal" population find these images more sexually arousing
than explicit images of mutually consenting sex. Additional research indicates that males who believe in the use of sexual force
and who state they might commit rape if not caught find rape
images more arousing, be it a mythical depiction where the woman
finds pleasure, or a realistic rape. 9 What is important is that sexual arousal as a response to depictions of violence against women
tends to be a fairly good predictor of attitudes about rape and, at
least in laboratory situations, aggressive behavior against women.
Another series of studies done by Neil Malamuth and others
show that exposure to these types of images affect a whole set of
attitudes about women and rape.1 0 One finding is that male subjects briefly exposed to sexually violent material, particularly to
material which maintains and reinforces stereotypes about rape,
will be less sensitive to real rape victims.11 For instance, if subjects read a story, see an X-rated film of a woman being raped, and
then listen to a real rape victim talk about her experience, the
male subjects will see less pain, less suffering, more responsibility
on her part, and less credibility. 12 In other words, they begin to
become somewhat desensitized and calloused regarding rape. One
also finds increased acceptance of stereotypes and myths about
rape.13
No researcher suggests these men are going to commit rape,
but only that these individuals are willing to say they might comComponents of Rapists' Sexual Arousal, 34 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 895-903 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as Abel].
7. Id.
8. Neil Malamuth, Aggression Against Women: Cultural and Individual

Causes, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra note 1, at 28-47.
9. Id. at 25.

10. Id. at 32-38.
11. Id. at 33.
12. Id.
13. Neil M. Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein, The Effects of Aggressive-Pornographic Mass Media Stimuli, in 15 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
103, 113-15 (Leonard Berkowitz ed. 1982).
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mit rape. Even the "liberalized" male college students, after exposure to this type of material, show an increased willingness to say
they might commit rape if not caught.14 Many of these students
report the use of force, particularly in dating situations.15
The studies on rape fantasy are also revealing. Two or three
hours after exposure to these types of images, male subjects report
that fantasizing about raping a woman is sexually arousing.16
In this light, it should be mentioned that researchers in this
area employ Martha Burt's rape myth acceptance scale. 17 Some
myths included are that women falsely report rape, that they have
a need to call attention to themselves, and that women have an unconscious wish to be raped and therefore set up a situation in
which they are likely to be attacked. Again, the research shows an
increase in the acceptance of these myths after exposure to violent
forms of pornography.' 8
One question which follows is whether it is the sexual content or the violent content of the material which produces these
attitudes and fantasies. My research suggests it is primarily the violent content. 19 A number of studies have found that if the sexual
content is removed, leaving just the violence, violence which could
be rated R or PG-13, the results are similar to those previously
20
described.
Finally, one should mention some newer research dealing
with R-rated materials called sex and violence juxtapositions or
combinations. These materials are primarily available to and consumed by young adolescents. The R-rated films are the most popular types viewed by this particular group. These films,
traditionally called slasher films, are far more graphically violent
than most X-rated material. Women are decapitated and mutilated in fairly graphic ways. There is very little which cannot be
simulated in a film today.
Women are the primary targets. Men are killed, but most of
the gratuitous violence is against women. What is of interest to researchers is that the violence against women in these films occurs
within some type of sexual context. When men are killed, they
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Martha R. Burt, CulturalMyths and Supportsfor Rape, 38 Journal of Per-

sonality & Soc. Psychology 217-30 (1980).
18. Malamuth & Donnerstein, supra note 13, at 103-36.
19. Edward Donnerstein, Pornography:Its Effect on Violence Against Women,
in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra note 1, at 53-81.
20. Id. at 71-81.
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are in "full tuxedo" as it has once been said. When women are
killed, it is in the shower, in the bathtub, in the act of making love.
For that young adolescent male there is some sexual overtone juxtaposed with some fairly graphic violence.
The newer research has focused upon the process of desensitization. Subjects are continually exposed to this material (though
sometimes only four hours per week produces dramatic effects).
Initially, when one is exposed to images of women being brutally
raped and decapitated, one is bothered, anxious, and depressed.
With repeated exposure, one is less and less bothered. In fact, not
only does the anxiety and depression lessen but one begins to enjoy these types of images. And with repeated exposure one begins
21
to see less and less violence in this material.
[Editor's note: At this point, Dr. Donnerstein showed a sequence from the film, The Tool Box Murders. In the film, a woman is in the bathtub massaging herself. A beautiful, countrywestern song, Pretty Lady, is playing in the background. In two
minutes, the psychotic killer breaks in to the woman's house. The
woman notices him, and he is carrying a power nail gun-the gun
drives nails through walls. The music stops. He chases her around
the room. He shoots her through the stomach with the nail gun.
She falls across a chair. He then comes up to her while the song
Pretty Lady again starts playing. He puts the nail gun to her forehead and blows her brains out. The film is R-rated.]
The question which follows is what happens when one leaves
the theater and confronts a real victim of violence after all of this
"fantasy" violence? In one study, subjects review this material
over a one- or two-week period. 22 Two days later, at the University of Wisconsin Law School, they sit in a courtroom and watch a
reenactment of a rape trial, a trial they believe actually occurred.
During the trial the researchers pass out a picture of the rape victim as a physician testifies. This is done to realistically simulate a
true rape trial. Their perceptions of a real victim of violence are
observed. The study tries to measure what the subjects perceive to
be the extent of injury done to the woman.
The basic finding is that, over time, subjects become less depressed and less anxious as they view this material. They see less
violence and find the material less offensive. They also find the
material less and less degrading to women. And there is some in21. Daniel Linz, Edward Donnerstein & Steven Penrod, The Effects of Multiple
Exposure to Filmed Violence Against Women, 34 Journal of Communication 130,

134-47 (1984).
22. Daniel Linz, Sexual Violence in the Media: Effects on Male Viewers and
Implications for Society, PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1985).
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dication they begin to enjoy these types of images. 23
Most important, those who have seen this type of "fantasy"
violence see about half the amount of injury to the rape victim as
subjects who have not seen this type of material. 24 The victim is
also considered to be more worthless as an individual. 2 5 In other
studies, the victim is seen as less credible, more responsible for the
rape. 26 These same types of effects are found with X-rated violent
material. 27 The effects are much stronger in males predisposed to
28
aggression or males considered to be high in psychoticism.
One should note that the type of material presented here is
readily available to any male due to technological advances, VCRs,
and cable. Given these advances, The Tool Box Murders becomes
for a young adolescent male perhaps his first introduction to anything dealing with a naked woman. These are going to become his
-masturbatory fantasies. One does not have to be a social science
researcher to think of some of the resulting implications.
Clinical Perspectives on the Relationship Between Pornography and
Sexual Violence
Cheryl A. Champion*

I am currently employed by Human Services, Inc. in Washington County, Minnesota. Human Services, Inc. is a private nonprofit organization which receives funding from the state of Minnesota. As part of the sexual abuse intervention and treatment
unit, my colleagues and I are responsible for a multifaceted program. We provide twenty-four hour crisis intervention, advocacy,
therapy, and support counseling for victims and their families. In
addition, we provide psychological evaluation and treatment for
both adult and juvenile offenders. The third component of our organization is a treatment program for families involved in the behavior of incest.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
* Cheryl Champion is a member and past officer of the Minnesota Coalition
of Sexual Assault Programs and a past member and officer of the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault. Ms. Champion currently serves on the Board of Directors for Organizing Against Pornography/A Resource Center for Education and
Action, Minneapolis, Minnesota. She lectures nationally on issues of violence
against women and feminist organizing.
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The state of Minnesota has a national reputation for its approach to working with victims and perpetrators. Funding for
both types of programs comes from the Minnesota Department of
Corrections, as mandated by the legislature in 1975. Our program
for victims, in which victims receive services for trauma and compensation for any loss, has become a model across the nation.
Likewise, the Minnesota system of providing intensive treatment for offenders, in addition to incarceration, is a novel approach toward rehabilitation. As one of our sex offenders recently
commented, "Putting a dirty rag in a closet for ten years and then
unlocking the door at the end of that time and expecting it to be
clean is a mistake." We attempt to rehabilitate sexual offenders
using intensive psychodynamic therapy for cognitive behavior
change and psychological insight into the dynamics of the crime.
Minnesota has several programs for the treatment of offenders, including outpatient treatment facilities for both adults and
juveniles, and locked inpatient facilities for more dangerous offenders who cannot live in a community during their treatment.
Both our men's and women's correctional institutions have their
own sex offender treatment programs. Inmates can voluntarily
apply to receive treatment while they serve their prison time.
Several things are clear from our work with offenders. First
of all, not every offender makes use of pornography. In fact, the
majority of our offenders are very rigid, controlled, and incredibly
shameful about sex. They have not made use of sex education
materials or sexually explicit materials and are very offended by
the idea of pornography. A conservative estimate would be that
only forty percent of our clinical cases involve perpetrators who
use pornography in some manner.
The behaviorial impact of pornography can be summarized as
follows. Concerning juvenile offenders, those who are exposed to
and involved with pornography often begin at a very early age,
earlier than other adolescents in our regular clinical population.
Among those adolescent offenders, their secretive collections are
significantly higher than those we find in other clinical populations of adolescents. When more appropriate sex education materials are made available, most of our juvenile offenders do not seem
to want pornographic material.
Now, speaking only about the adult offenders who are involved with pornography, the question becomes: would they have
chosen violent sexual acting out as opposed to other kinds of acting out without the influence of pornography? The question is always, why a rapist and not an axe murderer? If more appropriate
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erotic or sex education material were made available, would these
offenders make use of those materials? As Dr. Donnerstein noted,
adult sex offenders seem predisposed to violent behavior in psychological testing. When you look at the entertainment these people prefer, it is often the most violent kinds of movies. When you
look at their reading material, it is the same. I again have to concur that it is the violence that is attractive to these people.
Many of the facilities in the state struggle with limiting the
access of offenders and perpetrators to this sort of material. Until
the fantasy behavior is under control, even ordinary and appropriate materials, such as sex education books, even children's underwear ads in catalogs, can be misused. This raises a rather difficult
issue when people are incarcerated. The Civil Liberties Union
guards the civil rights of prisoners to insure they receive their mail
and have access to reading materials. A related issue concerns
prisoners' access to entertainment, for example television, rented
films, or videos. There are some difficult issues to balance regarding civil liberties of those people incarcerated and insuring the
safety of the staff and other inmates. For instance, films about
prison riots or about raping guards in prisons could be considered
to have explosive content. For those of us who provide sex offender treatment within the correctional institutions, many of
these issues are unresolved as yet and require a good deal more
contemplation on the part of experts.
When pornography is a part of a sex offender's life, the relationship has a very compulsive and obsessive quality to it. These
individuals have an active fantasy life involving the use of pornographic materials for masturbation, fantasy contemplation, and actual acting out of their scenarios on their victims. When offenders
are involved with pornography, we use it as a tool for redefining
their sexual behavior and orientation. It is clear to us that it does
influence behavior. Sexual gratification from pornography is a
strong reinforcer. We have created the phrase "masturbatory conditioning." If the offender masturbates to pictures of women being raped, murdered, and sexually assaulted, then even when he is
sexual with a partner in a nonviolent manner, in order to get
"turned on" and to complete the sex act through climax, his mind
must still think about rape and sexual assault. We try to redirect
the fantasy and masturbation to more appropriate, less violent
scenarios.
One of the underlying philosophical tenets of our outpatient
program is that all offenders in treatment must clean out their
homes, garages, cars, and offices of pornographic material. We are
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quite clear about not rationalizing the content. Everything must
go-pinups, books, magazines, television cassettes, and films. Offenders must also contract with us not to use pornography during
their treatment. There is an active discussion in groups about the
inappropriate nature of pornographic material.
One of the things we notice is that pornography takes over
the lives of our offenders to the exclusion of any other entertainment material. Some of our offenders have garages and basements
so full that they can be used for nothing but storage of pornographic materials. It is a relief, in fact a validating statement to
the families of these offenders, when we encourage them to dispose of these collections. In some ways their families have suspected all along that the pornography had some connection to
their sexual behavior.
I would also like to speak here for a moment about the impact of pornography upon the victims' lives. It is not uncommon
for our clients to speak of the pornography involved in their assaults when giving testimony in court or in processing the incidents in their therapy. I have a selection of several cases to
illustrate this point.
The first is a case of rape and torture of a young wife by her
husband. The husband was an avid consumer of sadomasochistic
and bondage pornography who created a complete torture chamber in their basement. The young wife, very uneducated about
sexual behavior, went along with it up until the birth of their first
child. The reason she sought assistance was that often her husband would leave her trussed up in some of the bondage equipment long past the feeding schedule for the infant, and she was
concerned about the health of the infant.
The second example is one in which two adolescent girls
were kidnapped by a transvestite assailant with a great deal of
gender confusion. The assailant terrified the girls by appearing
before them first as a man and then as a woman during various
stages of the assault. Part of the abuse involved his forcing the
two adolescent girls to be sexual with each other in a lesbian relationship that he had them recreate from a pornographic magazine.
The third example is a gang rape of a juvenile girl by six adolescent boys who used a pornographic magazine's pictorial and editorial layout to recreate a rape in the woods outside of their
housing development.
In many of our incest families, the perpetrators use pornography as tools or guides in order to initiate their family members
into sexual behavior. Manuals and books that speak of father-
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daughter love, father-son sex, or family love have been used to rationalize and validate this kind of behavior.
Many of our child molesters, both juvenile and adults, have
utilized both adult and child pornography as a way to initiate their
victims into the sexual behavior as well as a tool or guide for the
sexual behavior of child molesting. Many of our victims blame
themselves and feel a great deal of culpability because they believed the original depiction from pornography as being normal behavior between adults and children. In addition, many sex
offenders have vast collections of self-made pornography detailing
who their victims were and the acts they committed. This is a particularly traumatic issue for many of the victims we treat. It is a
source of extreme shame and embarrassment for the victims that
pictures of the activity between themselves and the offender exist.
We may not have all those pictures, copies of the pictures may
have been sold or traded to other collectors, or we may not have
found the entire collection. These collections are cataloged at the
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension and continue to exist long past
the time when the crime has been reported and handled in the
court. To complete treatment, the victim must put the crime into
the past. This is impossible, however, when existing photographs
continue to preserve the crime as a reality in the present.
Fantasy is the key to translating pornography to reality.
Therefore, the question becomes, how do we test consumers of
pornography for their ability to separate reality from fantasy?
Rape fantasies and their prevalence among both men and women
have been documented by researchers and raise a very important
question. Would these fantasies be so prevalent in our society if
the materials for formulating rape fantasies had not already been
there in the literature? Recent research by my colleague, Dr.
Donnerstein, indicates that a large percentage of the male population has a propensity to rape. Important inhibitors to acting out
this propensity are social controls such as the possibility of being
caught and apprehended, social norms that define rape as unacceptable behavior, and, the crucial inhibitor, conscience.
I would like to present a theory one of my colleagues has formulated for how pornography may be translated into "acting-out
behavior," as we call it in the psychology field. The first precondition is that pornography fosters violent fantasies and desires in
people who view it. Such pornography conveys the message that
many ordinary people commit such crimes, and that when they do,
they experience no remorse.
The second precondition is that pornography plays a role in
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overcoming internal barriers against acting out such desires. Pornography inhibits the conscience. If a man can persuade himself
that real women, like the women portrayed in pornography, really
like being raped (that they do not really mean "no" when they say
it), what reason is there for guilt?
The third precondition is that pornography erodes external
barriers by contributing to cultural support for rape. Consumers
of pornography may come to believe that rape is not a breach of
norms. By making rape appear easy to accomplish and easy to get
away with, pornography may change the fear of being caught.
The fourth precondition is that pornography melds sexuality
with violence. The laws of conditioning suggest that when people
are aroused by watching sex and violence together it becomes difficult to separate the two.
There are also some preconditions that we think apply to victims. A fifth precondition comes from psychological research and
our work with victims that show pain contributes to undermining
some women's assertiveness about what sexual acts they would engage in or resist. Encouragement of the use of violence or pain as
a way to overcome the resistance of victims is a prevalent scene in
pornography.
A sixth precondition also pertains to victims. The effect of
the portrayal of women and children as victims in pornography
may so undermine women's and children's self-esteem that they
are less able to resist this sexually coercive behavior when it is
forced upon them by family members, significant others, or
strangers.
In closing, I want to commend you for addressing this difficult issue. It is vital that you hear the testimony of experts such as
ourselves. You have been selected to represent the community
and its standards, to see that justice is provided, and that the dignity and safety of each citizen in the community is preserved. I am
proud of Minnesota for being the first community in the United
States to encourage an open dialogue about the issue of pornography, prohibitive legislation, and censorship. It is important that forums such as this one continue at all levels, not only for judges,
psychologists, and professionals, but for all the public as well. The
debate about pornography is one that must take place in the open,
so that people come to understand the effects that pornography
has on each individual in society.
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Notes on Pornography and the First Amendment
Cass R. Sunstein*
Efforts to regulate pornography 29 have met with considerable
resistance in the legal community. 30 That resistance is based on
general principles of free expression which do and should command widespread support. The goal of this presentation is to set
out a few reasons why the application of those principles to at least
some categories of pornographic materials seems to me illconceived.
It will be useful to begin by describing the law with respect to
sexually explicit materials, most of which derives from Miller v.
California,31 decided in the early 1970's. Under the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller, obscenity may be suppressed if (a)
under contemporary community standards, the average person
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) the work depicts sexual conduct specifically defined by state law, and does so "in a patently offensive way," and
(c) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.32 Miller sets out the basic constitutional
standards for regulation of sexually explicit materials, though
3
other cases have some relevance as well. 3
One decision rendered after Miller carries implications that
may turn out to be important. In New York v. Ferber,34 involving
child pornography, the Court held that the state could regulate the
distribution of some materials that did not fall within Miller.35
The Court reasoned that the materials in question involved harms
the state had a right to prevent-the use of children in pornography-and that the state could, consistent with the first amend* The reader is asked to give the normal indulgence for an essay based on a
transcript of oral remarks. A more elaborate treatment of this subject is Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the FirstAmendment, 1986 Duke L.J. (forthcoming). I am
grateful to Suzanna Sherry, Geoffrey R. Stone, and David A. Strauss for valuable
comments on an earlier draft.
29. For purposes of the present discussion it is unnecessary to attempt to define
the term with precision; I refer generally to sexually explicit materials that produce the various harms described infra.
30. See Geoffrey R. Stone, AntipornographyLegislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 701 (1986).
31. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
32. Id. at 24.
33. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
34. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
35. Id. at 753-54.
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ment, attempt to stop those harms by banning the sale and
distribution of the material. A more direct action by the state, in
the form of a prohibition of use of the children without attacking
the speech directly, would be less effective; enforcement of the underlying prohibition would be possible only with an effort to undermine the profit motive that generates child pornography in the
first place.
Because they allow government to suppress speech on the basis of its content, both Miller and Ferber might be thought to
strike discordant notes in the law of the first amendment. Moreover, their precise bearing on recent efforts to regulate pornography is far from clear. The Miller test allows suppression of a large
amount of pornographic material; but because its thrust was to define some forms of expression as "not speech" rather than to point
to the harms produced by such expression, it covers both more and
less than would a gender- and harm-based approach to this issue.
Miller, in short, allows regulation of some speech that causes few
or none of the relevant harms, and may forbid regulation of some
speech that produces all of them. At this stage it will be useful to
set out a quite straightforward, two-step argument for regulating
at least some pornographic materials. The argument, based on
conventional first amendment standards, is designed both to explain the roots of current doctrine and to suggest how other sorts
of regulations of pornography might be justified.
The first point is that much pornographic material, as I understand it here, lies far from the center of the first amendment
concern, however that center is defined. Under current doctrine,
and under any sensible system of free expression, speech that lies
at the periphery of constitutional concern may be regulated on the
basis of a lesser showing of government interest than speech that
lies at the "core." To say this is hardly to say that the definition of
the core and the periphery will be simple. Under any standard,
however, at least some pornographic materials will be easily classified. Some such materials, in purpose and effect, promote sexual
arousal rather than deliberation on public or private issues-the
central point in Miller-and thus these materials have little to do
with first amendment purposes as they have traditionally been understood. Such materials are analytically like a whip, or a prostitute, and not analytically like speech; they do not appeal in any
36
sense to the deliberative capacity of the community.
36. See Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity"
An Exercise in the Interpretationof ConstitutionalLanguage, 67 Geo. L.J. 899, 926,

928 (1979).
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This conclusion does not mean that pornographic materials
are entirely without first amendment protection. But one need
not subscribe in all respects to a Meiklejohnian conception of the
first amendment37 in order to conclude that speech relating to
public affairs is entitled to special protection against government
control. Expression that amounts to "words" is not, by virtue of
that fact, always immune from regulation unless government is
able to show an overwhelmingly powerful justification. Consider,
for example, commercial speech, laws prohibiting conspiracies
(which are after all words), laws prohibiting bribes, threats, and so
forth. All of these forms of speech are not treated analytically like
speech that falls within the core of the first amendment, because
they have little or nothing to do with deliberative processes on the
part of the community.
I do not suggest that this argument is airtight, that it will not
leave hard intermediate cases, or that it is, standing by itself, a sufficient reason for regulation of some or all categories of pornography. A particular difficulty here is that separation of the emotive
and cognitive, or nondeliberative and deliberative, aspects of
speech is difficult, and indeed it is something courts should generally avoid. The notion that speech that appeals to "reason" is especially valuable, and that speech that appeals to "emotion" is not,
depends on a highly controversial process of categorization. It may
be doubted that the two can sensibly be separated, and certainly
speech that does both is not, by virtue of that fact, entitled to less
than full first amendment protection. The problem of line drawing is formidable and might lend itself to abuse. There are also
risks in concluding that some categories of speech are of "low
value."
I cannot untangle all of these problems here. It cannot be
correct, however, to say that the same standards should govern
pornography as are applicable to the political speeches of, for example, Martin Luther King or Jerry Falwell. One would be hardpressed to defend a first amendment doctrine that would impose
the same burden of justification on the government for regulation
of all categories of speech. This proposition-that the burden on
government is different depending on the nature of the speech-is
of course quite familiar, indeed firmly entrenched, in first amendment law. 38

Once that step is taken, at least some pornographic

37. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to SelfGovernment (1948) (freedom of speech is a means of promoting self-government).
38. See generally Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet, Constitutional Law
ch. 7 (forthcoming 1986) (discussing categories of "low value" speech).
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material may be regulated on the basis of a lesser showing of
harm.
Even if the "low value" argument is accepted and found applicable to pornography, the argument does not in itself justify
regulation of words which are after all entitled to first amendment
protection. The arguments for regulation of pornography, however, turn out to be surprisingly powerful. The most persuasive
arguments do not stress the offensive character of sexually explicit
material or its effects on the "environment"-the features emphasized by the Court in the Miller case. Instead the arguments stress
three different points.
First, there is a causal connection between pornography and
violence against women. 39 The extent of the effect and the precise
correlation between exposure to pornographic and sexual violence
are sharply disputed. But there can be no doubt that pornography
does increase the incidence of sexual violence against women. To
be sure, most men will not commit rape "as a result of" pornography, and most rapes would occur without pornography; but a reading of the literature suggests that pornography significantly
increases the aggregate level of sexual violence. The first justification for regulation thus stems from discernible harms whose extent is uncertain but whose existence is undeniable.
Second, the existence of the pornography market produces a
number of harms to models and actresses. Some women are coerced into pornography. Others are abused and mistreated, often
in grotesque ways, once they have entered the pornography "market." A less restrictive alternative to regulation would be to ban
the coercion or mistreatment, as indeed current law does. Such an
alternative would also be far less effective. The most effective way
to eliminate the practice is to eliminate or reduce the financial
benefits-a point the Supreme Court recognized, albeit in a somewhat different context, in the Ferber case.
Third, and more generally, pornography reflects and promotes attitudes toward women that are degrading and dehumanizing and that result in a variety of forms of illegal conduct.
Pornography portrays women as enjoying being abused, beaten,
and raped. The pornography industry is an important conditioning
factor for both men and women, a factor that has significant consequences for the existence of equality between men and women. To
be sure, it is as much a symptom as a cause, but it is a cause as
well. This effect is sometimes thought to argue against rather
39. See generally Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra note 1 (collecting
studies on causal relationship).
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than in favor of regulation, for it suggests that pornography influences social attitudes. As argued in more detail below, however,
such effects are usually a by-product rather than a purpose of pornography, and in any event the effects are achieved through nondeliberative means, a fact that bears significantly on the constitutional issue.
The second prong of the argument for regulation is thus that
some forms of pornography produce considerable harm, and it is
possible for government to be quite concrete about the nature of
that harm. Because the burden of justification on the government
ought to be more lenient in light of the nature of the speech, the
constitutional case for regulation is quite powerful. I emphasize
that I am not talking here about the precise scope of any regulation of pornography, but instead suggesting that, in light of widely
accepted first amendment doctrine, efforts to deal with the problem should not pose insuperable first amendment difficulties.
There are two categories of objections to this argument for
regulation. The first was set out by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit-the only court to have dealt with
the subject 4 O-in a decision recently affirmed summarily by the
Supreme Court.41 The court reasoned that an argument that
would regulate pornographic materials by reference to the three
harms referred to above is worse, rather than better, than the
Miller standard. Indeed, it would be worse than Miller even if the
category of speech suppressed turned out to be narrower than the
category that can be suppressed under Miller. According to the
court, a statute that imposed sanctions on a subcategory of Miller
speech, defined by reference to these harms, would be unconstitutional even under Miller.42
At first glance that proposition seems quite mysterious, but
the basic approach is conventional within first amendment doctrine. Regulation of speech is most troublesome-under doctrine
which should command widespread support-if it is based on government's disapproval of the viewpoint in question. If the state enacts a law to the effect that no one may speak favorably about
Republicans on billboards, it is acting more unconstitutionally
than if it passes a law forbidding anyone to say anything on billboards. This conclusion holds even though the second regulation
eliminates "more" speech. The first measure is more troublesome
because it is based on government antipathy to viewpoint, a partic40. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).

41. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
42. 771 F.2d at 323.
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43
ularly severe first amendment evil.

The reasoning of the court of appeals was that regulation of
pornography that draws lines on the basis of harms to women
amounts to discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. Such regula-

44
tion is therefore, in the court's words, "thought control," for it is

constructing a socially approved view of the relations between men
and women and imposing that approved view through law. People
with the approved view can speak; people with the disapproved
view cannot; and that, in the court's view, is what the first amendment centrally prohibits.
The initial response to this argument is straightforward: an
antipornography law that derives from the various harms identified above is not viewpoint-based in the same sense as the anti-Republican billboard regulation. The legislature is not aiming at
ideas but instead at concrete harms. It is, in this sense, a mistake
to treat a law aimed at pornography because of new findings of
harm as if it were a law sanctioning a particular view about the appropriate role of men and women. A regulation based straightforwardly on viewpoint would not be difficult to imagine. Such a law
might say, for example, that anyone critical of the Equal Rights
Amendment cannot offer his or her critique if the critique is
founded on the proposition that women should be subordinate to
men. Alternatively, it might forbid all artistic expression, whether
or not sexually explicit, that portrays women as subordinate to
men. That is not the sort of law that would derive from the harms
described above.
A rejoinder would point out that the line between aiming at
ideas on the one hand and at harms on the other is thin. 45 Indeed,
some statutes ordinarily thought to be based on viewpoint might
be explained, by their defenders, as based on harm. A statute that
forbids speech unfavorable to government in times of war is justified on the basis of the harms that flow from such speech; in this
sense, it is said by its defenders to be viewpoint-neutral. The fact
that viewpoint-based statutes can be defended in terms of harms
raises a difficult and largely unexplored problem in first amendment theory. The ordinary categories of viewpoint-neutral and
viewpoint-based regulations turn out to be less obviously defensi43. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wn. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983) (discussing reasons for judicial skepticism
about viewpoint-based regulations).

44. 771 F.2d at 328.
45. See generally Stone, supra note 30 (arguing that anti-pornography legislation is viewpont-based notwithstanding relevant harms).
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ble when measures that fall within the latter category turn out to
be not based straightforwardly on viewpoint at all.
I cannot sort out this problem in these brief remarks. It may
help to suggest that the ordinary hostility to viewpoint-based regulation derives in part from a suspicion of any effort by the government to prevent speech on the ground that it might persuade
people to engage in a particular course of conduct. The remedy for
efforts at persuasion is not to prevent the speech, but to counter it
with "more speech"46 and to attack unlawful conduct directly. To
be sure, regulation we ordinarily treat as viewpoint-based may be
defended by reference to harms, but it is entitled to special judicial
hostility because it attempts to bypass deliberative processes of the
public and to control those processes by a constitutionally impermissible means. Consider, for example, a law forbidding criticism
of government during times of war; the risk about which government is concerned stems from fear that people may be persuaded.
That risk, deriving from the possibility of persuasion by argument,
is one to be countered by more speech and by direct control of unlawful conduct.
By contrast, pornography regulation need not be seen as
viewpoint-based in the relevant sense. It does not, by hypothesis,
interfere with speech that appeals to deliberative processes but instead with speech that aims at something else altogether. And the
point is unaffected by the fact that pornography does in a sense
"persuade"; it does so in ways that, again by hypothesis, have nothing to do with deliberation. The evils posed by viewpoint regulation-government
circumvention
of ordinary
deliberative
processes-are thus not present. The proper analogies here include bribes and threats, which are, in a sense, viewpoint-based,
but are not treated as such because deliberation is not involved.
Indeed, the law of the first amendment contains several categories
of viewpoint regulation that are not "seen" as such because of the
nature of the regulation and the harms involved. Consider regulation of labor speech, commercial speech, and even obscenity.
Whether a regulation is impermissibly viewpoint-based thus turns
on point of view. The constitutional outcome should depend on
the process by which the message is communicated, the centrality
of the speech to the first amendment, the existence of genuine
harms, and the likelihood that the harms will be remedied by reg46. This is, of course, a reference to Justice Brandeis's suggestion that "more
speech, not enforced silence" is the remedy for speech that may bring about harmful consequences. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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ulation. On all of these counts, antipornography regulation should
be permissible.
The court of appeals in the Indianapolis case 47 held that it
need not explore the "low value/high value" issue because a harm48
based approach to pornography is actually based on viewpoint.
But that approach seems to have it backwards: whether the approach should be treated as viewpoint-based turns out to depend
49
on whether the speech in question is, in a sense, high-value. To
say all this is to outline very briefly what will in all likelihood turn
out to be a complex argument. But it should suffice to show that it
is too facile to think that any approach to pornography of the sort
advocated here must be invalidated on grounds of viewpoint
discrimination.
The second argument against that approach points to the
overbreadth of regulations that might result from basing laws on
the three harms to which I have referred. Overbreadth is, of
course, a technical term in first amendment doctrine; the concern
is that in the course of regulating unprotected speech, government
may in the process censor speech that is not subject to control.
The problem of overbreadth 50 stems from the ordinary limitations of written texts, which will quite generally catch some conduct that the lawmaker would prefer not to regulate. Many laws
are, by virtue of their text, applicable to conduct that the legislature did not want to reach. The conclusion applies to regulation of
speech. The Miller standard itself, for example, could be interpreted by some to regulate speech that the Supreme Court did not
want to cover; that is one reason why there have been many cases
after Miller. Indeed, in light of the limitations of written words,
there is a risk of overbreadth in any civil or criminal regulation.
But that risk is hardly sufficient to justify doing nothing about a
significant problem. For this reason overbreadth arguments are always important, and sometimes dispositive, but rarely sufficient to
justify a decision not to act to control a serious problem. And in
considering the question of definition, it is important to keep in
mind that the fact that a prohibition might have troublesome or
47. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 334.
49. The qualification is necessary because various imaginable regulations might
aim at viewpoint within the category of low-value speech. Imagine a statute saying
that pornographic materials in favor of Democrats are permissible, but those in
favor of Republicans are not. The problem with such measures is that like ordinary
viewpoint-based regulations, they are designed to and do in fact skew deliberative
processes, an impermissible first amendment goal.
50. I emphasize problems of overbreadth rather than vagueness here. The two
points are related, and the vagueness difficulty is subject to an analogous response.
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unacceptable applications is not ordinarily thought to be a reason
not to have a prohibition at all. These considerations are reflected
in the Supreme Court's recent narrowing of the overbreadth
51
doctrine.
The more specific point is that it should be possible to draft a
law whose coverage would be targeted to the sorts of harms that
justify an antipornography law. Under the first amendment, it is
properly necessary to do this sort of precise targeting. The first
point here is that one can be clear about the category of regulated
speech if one focuses on both the harms produced by pornographic
materials and the basic rationale for regulation. In the event this
should prove insufficient, let me mention, without necessarily endorsing, three ways of limiting antipornography laws that are
targeted to the harms identified above. And it is important to emphasize that I am not attempting to set out a statute with precisely
the right degree of breadth and clarity, but instead to suggest that
the justifications for regulation of pornography are sufficient to
support regulation of at least some pornography, and that a focus
on those justifications is the most useful way to approach the constitutional problem.
First, the definition might point to the work "considered as a
whole." It may be, for example, that the material in question will
contain scenes falling within the prohibited class, but that on balance it poses little or nothing in the way of those harms. Second,
the definition might be narrowed to exclude from its coverage
works with serious literary, artistic, or other value. Third, some
distinction might be drawn between visual media, particularly
films-which in all likelihood pose special harms in terms of the
underlying justifications for regulation-and written work. All
three ways of narrowing the regulation would have vices as well as
virtues: they may allow evasion; and they may permit materials to
escape regulation that pose one or more of the evils pointed to
above. But they support the conclusion that it is possible to draft a
law that is not overbroad within the meaning of the first
amendment.
In the final analysis, objections to regulation of pornography
tend to come in one of two categories. The first is that the speech
at issue-and again I am defining it quite narrowly-is independently worthy of first amendment protection and should not be
suppressed. I believe that this objection, which is in fact rarely offered, is not powerful. The speech of which we are speaking (1) by
hypothesis causes significant harms and (2) is far from the central
51. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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concerns of the first amendment. Indeed, a large part of that
speech is already subject to ban-though, strikingly, it is infrequently banned in practice-under the current law of obscenity. If
pornographic materials were prohibited, it is doubtful that the prohibition, standing alone, would pose any threat to the principles
underlying a properly functioning system of free expression.
The second objection is a conventional one in first amendment debate. The concern is that if one allows a particular category of speech to be regulated, it will be difficult or impossible to
draw lines, and the result will be a body of doctrine much less protective of speech than one would prefer. It is impossible, some will
argue, to generate limiting principles that can confine the reach of
a harm-based approach to speech.
In this context, however, that argument is misplaced. A
quick albeit partial answer would point to the experience of other
countries that have allowed regulation of some categories of pornography without endangering general principles of freedom of
expression. Indeed, for most of the history of the United States,
some such regulation has been permitted without seriously risking
first amendment rights. The current prohibition of obscenity, of
fighting words, of some kinds of commercial speech, and of
libelous statements has not produced significant threats to the first
amendment or its underlying purposes. The argument outlined
above is designed to justify regulation of pornography without at
the same time allowing control of other forms of speech, and it is
hard to see what other categories of expression could be regulated
as a result. One may sometimes have a hard time in drawing lines,
but I am quite doubtful that greater regulation of pornography,
and recognition of pornography as a form of sex discrimination,
would lead to troublesome inroads on a well-functioning system of
free expression.
I conclude with one further point. American constitutional
law is rightly hostile to censorship. Ordinarily the remedy for the
harms produced by speech is, as Justice Brandeis had it, "more
speech, not enforced silence."52 And it is no light thing to add a
new category of unprotected speech or to increase (at least in some
respects) the size of an existing category-especially where the
breadth of the addition is uncertain. Freedom of speech, conventionally understood, has of course been an important contributor
to unpopular causes, including those favoring women.
The first amendment concerns have made many resistant to
assimilating the new arguments against pornography into constitu52. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 4:17

tional law. But the burden of this discussion has been that the
resistance depends on a simultaneous undervaluing of the harms
produced by pornography and an overvaluing of the risks produced
by some inevitable definitional vagueness.
Pornography as Sex Discrimination
Catharine A. MacKinnon*
Over time, this government has tried various approaches to
the problem of pornography. The 1970 president's commission
found that, although pornography may outrage sensibilities and offend tastes and morals, it was harmless.53 In the face of these
findings, the Supreme Court nonetheless decided that when
materials violate community standards, appeal to the prurient interest, are patently offensive, and are otherwise worthless, they
may be prohibited as obscenity. 54 State and local legislatures have
tried confining obscenity by zoning it, 5 5 defining it as a moral nuisance, 56 hiding it behind opaque covers in secret rooms, 57 or by
5 8
paying the pornographers to get out of town.

Despite these attempts, the pornography industry has flourished. I think that obscenity law may be part of the reason why.
In order to find that something appeals to the prurient interest,
for example, a finder of fact must admit to arousal by the material.
The more violent the material, the less likely this becomes, because people do not tend to want to admit publicly that they are
sexually aroused by violent materials. Similarly, to be patently offended by materials, it is necessary to not be desensitized to them.
People are neither aroused nor offended by materials to which
they are desensitized, so that the more pornography one sees, the
less offensive it becomes. Taken together, the tests of prurient interest and patent offensiveness have a built-in bind. Finders of
* Catharine A. MacKinnon is a feminist lawyer, writer, teacher, and activist.
With Andrea Dworkin, she co-authored the Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Los Angeles,
and Cambridge proposed ordinances defining pornography as a violation of civil
rights.
53. The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970).
54. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
55. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). An example
enunciated after this speech was delivered is City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), which permitted a zoning scheme that banished adult
theatres to industrial areas.
56. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
57. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th
Cir. 1985).
58. St. Paul, Minnesota, is an example.
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fact are required to admit both that the materials arouse them sexually and that the materials offend them patently. That which
turns them on, they must also reject as revolting. This may begin
to clarify why pornography is perhaps the last thing obscenity law
has been used to address.
Perhaps an even more fundamental problem is that pornography is so profitable-sexually to its users and financially to its
pushers-that it effectively sets community standards. The more
pornography exists in a community, the more likely it is that community standards will de facto come to correspond to it. As Ed
Donnerstein's data and discussion showed,5 9 consumer preferences
escalate toward the more violent materials-a dynamic which
means that new markets, hence greater profits, are created
through creating community standards that tolerate more and
more violating materials.
Primarily, though, pornography has been allowed to flourish
because its real harm has been legally and socially obscured. I
mean the violation of women and children that is essential to its
making and inevitable through its use. This harm could be overlooked, and has been overlooked, because the pornographers, who
are pimps, take people who are already powerless, who begin socially powerless-the poor, the young, the innocent, the used, the
already used up, the desperate, the female-and deepen their invisibility and their silence. Pornography deepens their invisibility
and their silence through making their subjection the sexually enjoyable, the sexually enjoyed, sex itself. Women are coerced to
perform for pornography and are made to act as if they are enjoying themselves. 60 This pornography then is forced on women
who are forced to act it out, to correspond to the way the pornography uses and presents the women in it. It then becomes possible
to point to the world pornography has created and say that it
truthfully expresses women's nature, because it corresponds to
their reality. This process has succeeded in making the victims of
pornography so invisible as victims that through years of inquiry,
including the 1970 commission, the only harm this government
59. Professor Donnerstein presented his data prior to my discussion. A particularly lucid presentation of his results to that date can be found in Public Hearings
on Ordinances to Add Pornographyas DiscriminationAgainst Women: Before the
Minneapolis City Council Gov't Operations Comm., 1st Sess. 4-12 (Dec. 12, 1983)

(on file with Law & Inequality Journal) [hereinafter the entire volume is cited as
Hearings]. See also Donnerstein, supra note 19.
60. Linda Lovelace, Ordeal (1980); Michael A. Gershel, Evaluating a Proposed
Civil Rights Approach to Pornography:Legal Analysis as if Women Mattered, 11
Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 41, 55 (1985); Margaret Baldwin, The Sexuality of Inequality:
The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance, 2 Law & Inequality 629, 636-37 (1984).
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could see was sex it disapproved of seeing, rather than its most
powerless citizens being hurt. Pornography has made its victims
so silent that until the hearings on the proposed civil rights antipornography ordinance in Minneapolis in December of 1983, no of6
ficial body heard them scream, far less speak. 1
The United States Supreme Court recently admitted that the
obscenity doctrine had missed something, someone actually, for
whose injuries the law had therefore been inadequate. When it
recognized in the Ferber 62 case that child pornography is a form of
child abuse--over the opposition of the ACLU, I might add-and
whether or not the materials are obscene is beside the point, the
Court found that pornography made using children could be criminally banned consistent with the first amendment. With many
others, Andrea Dworkin and I have been working to expose the
specific atrocities to women that have also been hidden, and for
which existing law remains inadequate. These abuses were documented here in Minneapolis in December, 1983, for the first time
in the history of the world to our knowledge-which is an appalling fact in itself. The abuses that were spoken in public include
coercion to perform for pornography,6 3 the pervasive forcing of
pornography on individuals,64 assaults directly caused by specific
pornography, 65 and the targeting for rape,66 battery, 67 sexual harassment, 68 sexual abuse as children, 6 9 forced prostitution, 70 and
the civil denigration and inferiority characteristic of a second class
civil status that is endemic to this traffic in female sexual
7
slavery. 1
Pornography makes women what Andrea Dworkin has called
"the sexual disappeared of this society." 72 Because these injuries
61. Hearings, supra note 59; see Baldwin, supra note 60; Catharine MacKinnon,
Pornography,Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 22-60 (1985).

62. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 742 (1982).
63. Hearings, supra note 59, 2d Sess., at 40.
64. Id., 1st Sess., at 13-17.
65. Id., 2d Sess., at 37-39.
66. Diana Russell later documented a rate of 16,000 rapes per million women
that the victims attributed directly to pornography. Diana Russell, The Impact of
Pornography on Women (testimony prepared for the Attorney General's Comm'n
on Pornography Hearings, Houston, Texas, Sept. 11, 1985). See also MacKinnon,

supra note 61, at 12 n.20.
67. Hearings, supra note 59, 3d Sess., at 65-66.
68. Id., 2d Sess., at 50-54.
69. Id. at 39-40.
70. Id., 1st Sess., at 13-17.
71. Hearings, supra note 59. Kathleen Barry describes the larger context in
which women are trapped into selling their sexuality for survival in Female Sexual
Slavery (1979).
72. Effect of Pornography on Women and Children: Hearings Before the Sub-
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are disproportionally inflicted on women; because they are inflicted on everyone who is victimized by them on the basis of their
sex; because virtually nothing is being done about it; and because
women matter-this seems to be the real sticking point-we proposed a new approach: that pornography be civilly actionable by its
victims as sex discrimination and recognized as a violation of
human rights.
I first want to discuss the harm of pornography, then the appropriateness of our approach to that harm, and finally, briefly,
the first amendment issues. I will begin with an analysis of the evidence showing how the ordinances we conceived and drafted respond to the evidence and the injuries in a way existing law does
not.
The harm of pornography begins with the women in it. In
pornography, you see women being bound, battered, tortured, humiliated, and sometimes killed--or merely taken and used. For
every act you see in the visual materials, a woman actually had to
be tied or cut or burned or gagged or whipped or chained, hung
from a meat hook or from trees by ropes, as in Penthouse, December, 1984, urinated on or defecated on, forced to eat excrement,
penetrated by eels or rats or knives or pistols, raped deep in the
throat with penises, smeared with blood, mud, feces, and ejaculate.7 3 Or merely-and this includes the glossy legitimate men's

entertainment magazines-taken through every available orifice or
posed, presented, displayed as though that were her fondest wish
in life. Penis into vagina intercourse, by the way, is a minority
theme.
Pornography sexualizes women's inequality. It makes the inequality of women sexy. It sexualizes, most broadly speaking,
dominance and submission. Every kind of woman is used, each
one's particular inequalities exploited as deemed sexually exciting.
Asian women are bound so they are not recognizably human,
so inert they could be dead. Black women play plantation, struggling against their bonds. Jewish women orgasm in reenactments
of Auschwitz. Pregnant women and nursing mothers are accessible, displayed. Women are splayed across hoods of cars, trussed
comm. on Juvenile Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22755 (1984) (testimony of Andrea Dworkin).
73. Such materials are readily available at any pornography store. Some materials in which women are treated in these ways are on file with Organizing Against
Pornography/A Resource Center for Education and Action, Minneapolis, MN.
They include: Black Tit and Body Torture; Chair Bondage; Hard Boss; Hard
Leather; Penthouse 119-27 (Dec. 1984); Slave Auction; and Tit Torture Photos.
Most pornography contains no page numbers, volume numbers, or dates.
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like dead prey. Amputees and other disabled or ill women's injuries or wounds or stumps are proffered as sexual fetishes. Retarded girls are gratifyingly compliant. Adult women are
infantilized as children, children are adult women, interchangeably fusing vulnerability with the sluttish eagerness said to be natural to women of all ages, beginning at age one. So-called lesbians,
actually women sexually arranged with other women for the purpose of being watched and claimed, are bought and sold with the
rest.
The point is, because the profit from these mass violations
counts and women do not, because these materials are valued and
women are not, because the pornographers have credibility and
rights and powerful friends to front for their interests and women
do not, the products of these acts are protected and women are
not. So these things are done so that pornography can be made of
them. All of you who have been looking for a "direct causal link"
between pornography and harm might consider this one.
The pornography industry is largely an organized crime industry in which overt force is standard practice. Yet the question
persists, are these women there because they like it. Pimps are
known for their violence, yet the question persists, are these women there as an expression of pure freedom. In a society whose
opportunities for women are so limited that prostitution is many
women's best economic option, even when explicit violence is not
used, as often it is,7 4 the compulsion of poverty, of drugs, of the

street, of foreclosed alternatives, or of fear of retribution for non75
cooperation can be enforcement enough.
Every act that is exacted from the women in the pornography, who are typically made to act as though they are enjoying
themselves, is acted out on yet more women integral to the pornography's consumption. Such women are given no choice about
seeing the pornography or about performing the sex. The pornography is forced on them to destroy their self-respect and their
resistance to sexual aggression, to terrorize them into compliance
or silence as a sex act in itself, or to instruct and season them for
exact replication of the scripts and postures and scenes. Our testimony shows that rapes are thereby stimulated, inspired,
fantasized, planned, and actualized.7 6 We have women held down
while the pornography is held up; women turned over as the pages
are turned over.
74. See Hearings,supra note 59, 2d Sess., at 46-49.
75. See id., 1st Sess., at 13-17.
76. See generally id., 2d Sess., at 37-52, 58-59, 65-66.
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The evidence is consistent across social studies, 77 clinicians
who work with victims and perpetrators, 78 battered women's shelters, 79 rape crisis centers,8 0 groups of former and current prostitutes,8 1 incest survivors and their therapists,8 2 court cases,83 and
police.8 4 The most direct evidence, typically given the low value of
those who provide it, comes from the victims themselves, used on
one end of pornography or the other. This evidence, together with
the laboratory tests in controlled experiments on what are termed
non-predisposed normals (meaning men) and some recent correlational results, support the conclusion that exposure to pornography increases attitudes and behaviors of aggression and
discrimination, specifically by men against women.8 5 This conclusion is particularly supported by this evidence if you see that administering electric shock is a behavior, and if you see that not
seeing an account of a rape is an account of a rape, is a form of
discrimination. The increment of increase in aggression due to exposure varies according to the type of pornography, but it varies
only in degree.
I think these results occur because sex and violence are inextricably interwoven in the harm of pornography. They are interwoven in the material itself. Pornography makes sex into a
violation and makes rape and torture and intrusion into sex. The
sex and the violence are interwoven on every other level of the
pornography's social existence as well. Over time and exposure,
many viewers respond sexually to violence against women
whether it is presented in a sexualized context or not.8 6 It therefore is sex, behaviorally speaking. Too, violence is used to coerce
women to perform for materials that show violence, but violence is
77. See Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra note 1.
78. Hearings, supra note 59, 3d Sess., at 72-73 (testimony of Daryl Dahlheimer,
psychotherapist).
79. Id. at 67-71 (testimony of Wanda Richardson, Harriet Tubman Women's
Shelter and Sharon Rice Vaughn, Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women).
80. Id. at 71 (testimony of Barbara Chester, Director of the Rape and Sexual
Assault Center).
81. Id. at 83-85 (testimony of Sue Santa, Minneapolis Youth Division).
82. Id. at 74-76 (testimony of Cheryl Champion, Washington County Human
Services, Inc.).
83. See MacKinnon, supra note 61, at 46-50 nn. 107-08.
84. Id. at 63-65 (testimony of Bill Neiman, Assistant County Attorney, Hennepin County Attorney's Office); see generally Ann Jones, A Little Knowledge, in
Take Back the Night: Women on Pornography 179, 181 (Laura Lederer ed. 1980).
85. See generally Donnerstein, supra note 19; MacKinnon, supra note 61, at 5253 nn. 116-18 (collecting studies).
86. Professor Donnerstein told me in conversation that it was proving impossible to make a film for laboratory purposes of only violence against women in which
a significant number of subjects did not see sex.
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also used to coerce women to perform for materials which are sexually explicit, are subordinating, but do not show the violence it
took to make them.8 7 The violence that is recognized as violence
occurs off screen, except perhaps for the bruises the make-up fails
to cover. Women are also forceably compelled to consume pornography until they acquiesce without further complaint or resistance
in sex that violates their personal dignity, their desires, their bodies, not to mention their sexual preferences, without the need for
further violence.
Pornography is an icon of male supremacy, the fusion of
those twin icons, sex and speech. Thus legitimized, it neither appears nor needs to be violent at all times. Subjection is always violating, but it is not always violent; even less often it is perceived as
such.
Further effects of exposure to pornography include the trivialization and objectification of women, increased acceptance of
rape myths, desensitization to sexual force, and spontaneous rapefantasy generation.8 8 These are the so-called attitudes, so far from
being considered violence to some that they are not even considered behavior. Sexual arousal is the only thing that does not seem
to desensitize, so long as the materials escalate, yet nobody seems
very sure whether it is an attitude or a behavior. But the only
thing we cannot yet predict with exactness, although some of our
colleagues are working on it, is which individual woman will be
next on which individual man's list and for what specific expression of his escalated misogyny. We do know that such acts will occur. We do know that these materials, through the arousal they
do cause, will contribute to these acts of misogyny, causally to
many. We also know that the more pornography is consumed in
the society, the less harmful these acts will socially be perceived as
being. We also know that such acts will typically occur in contexts
traditionally regarded as consensual, if not intimate, giving the
aura of consent to the acts themselves: in marriages and families,
on dates, among acquaintances, on the job, in churches, in schools,
in doctors' offices, in prostitution. Rarely between strangers. Almost always between women and men.
On the basis of this analysis of its social reality, we have concluded that pornography, not alone but crucially, institutionalizes
a subhuman victimized second class status for women in particular. If a person can be denigrated, and doing that is defended and
87. See, i.e., Lovelace, supra note 60.
88. See Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra note 1; Hearings. supra
note 59, 1st Sess., at 4-12 (testimony of Dr. Donnerstein); see also supra note 85.

1986]

PORNOGRAPHY

legalized as freedom; if one can be tortured and the enjoyment of
watching it is considered entertainment protected by the Constitution; if the pleasure that other people derive from one's pain is the
measure of one's social worth, one isn't worth much, socially
speaking.
Our legal argument is simple: tolerance of such practices is
inconsistent with any serious mandate of equality and with the
reasons speech is protected. The civil rights approach to pornography is based on the notion that this remains true even when the
means are words and pictures, the enjoyment and pleasure are
sexual and economic, and even when-again, this seems to be the
difficult part-the victims are women.
Based on empirical investigation of the materials actually
available now in this country that do this damage, our law defines
pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and words that also includes women being
sexually used and abused, for example being dehumanized as sexual objects who enjoy pain, humiliation or rape, bound, mutilated,
bruised, dismembered, in postures of servility or submission or display, or penetrated by objects or animals. Men, children, or
transsexuals, all of whom are sometimes violated in these same
ways in and through pornography, can sue for similar treatment.8 9
The term sexually explicit is an existing legal term that also
has a popular meaning. Sexually explicit means explicitly showing
sex. It was difficult to find an adult who had any problem knowing what that meant until we used it in our law. As a matter of
fact, it is typically used to clarify the meaning of other words that
are considered ambiguous or problematic, like prurient.
A subordinate is the opposite of an equal. The term subordination refers to an active practice of making a person unequal.
Teacher/student, employer/employee, guard/prisoner are all unequal relationships. The idea of the law of sex equality is that man/
woman not be such a relationship. The verb to subordinate refers
to the active processes of enforcement of second class status. The
word has long been used to analyze race relations under white
supremacy. Again, the only problem in identifying it appears to
arise when we apply it to the situation of women in pornography.
I think this is a problem of the pervasiveness of the subordination
of women, specifically of the sexualization of women's subordination, so that a woman being subordinated comes to be perceived as
just who women are and as just what sex is. But this invisibility
89. Indianapolis, Ind., City-County General Ordinance 35 (June 11, 1984)
(amending ch. 16 of the Code of Indianapolis and Marion County).
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makes the harm more, not less. As the difficulty of perceiving the
harm increases, so also can the severity.
Subordination can include objectification: making a person
into a thing. It can include hierarchy: having made a person into a
thing, you make them less than you, lower than you. It can include forced submission: after making a person a thing and lower
and less than you, they better do what you tell them to do. At its
extreme, subordination includes violence. All are fundamental to,
and typical in, pornography. 90
Now presumably it is obvious that this is not the obscenity
test. To be pornography, materials must be graphic and sexually
explicit and subordinate women and also include at least one of
the concrete list of particulars that are stated in the ordinance. If
materials fit this definition they do this harm.
Just the fact that they exist, however, does not make them
actionable. Only alleged victims of specific activities of coercion
into pornography, of forcing pornography on a person, of assault
caused by specific pornography, and of trafficking-which is production, sale, exhibition, or distribution of provable subordination--can sue. Some people believe that most if not all of these
acts are already illegal. No existing law adequately reaches the
materials which provide the incentive, the actualization, and the
realization of these harms. And so long as the materials are protected and profitable, as they are, it will be effectively impossible
to reach any of the included acts. As things stand, all you have to
be able to do is to do them, to get away with them.
There is also a built-in perversity in enforcing existing criminal laws while leaving the materials untouched. Not only does it
require that the acts already be done before anything can be done
about them; it provides an incentive to murder. Pornography is already an incentive to rape a woman and run. But the more likely
it is that the perpetrator will be criminally prosecuted, the greater
incentive there is to do away with the evidence. Another prostitute O.D.'d in an alley, so what. Also, murdering women for the
camera creates snuff films, which actually show women and children being murdered, 91 a very profitable form of pornography,
which also ensures that the victim is not a witness. This is one
90. This discussion is taken directly from Andrea Dworkin's lucid conceptualization of subordination in Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship,
Pornography,and Equality, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1985).

91. See, i.e., Two Accused of Murder in Snuff Film, Oakland Tribune, Aug. 6,
1983, at A6, col. 1 (two teenage girls reported murdered in the making of a porno-

graphic movie).
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reason why it is so important that women other than those in the
pornography can also bring civil claims.
Privacy law, in theory, could reach some of these materials.
Of course, it doesn't reach the abusive acts, and not all states have
such laws. Attempts by individual women to restrict materials
that use their image without their permission have proven especially unhelpful in seeking relief for sexual invasion of privacy
through media.92 Also consider that lynching, for instance, was assault and battery or murder. But it did not begin to be effectively
addressed as a practical matter until those organizations which
practiced it as concerted racism were held accountable under federal civil rights law. Sexual harassment could also have been a
tort, a contract violation, or a criminal battery; some sexual harassment includes rape. But it wasn't until sexual harassment was recognized as sex discrimination that something began to be done
about it. Existing law exists, and so does pornography, with its entire range of abuse. To rely on existing law is to display a peculiar
complacency in the face of human suffering, since the legal status
quo has rather obviously permitted the suffering which constitutes
the social status quo.
Now I will discuss the first amendment issues briefly. Pornography as defined in our law undermines sex equality-a compelling state interest and a legitimate concern of government-by
harming people, differentially women. Under current first amendment law, exceptions are recognized. Speech interests are sometimes outweighed by other interests. The most common reason is
harm. Compared with existing exceptions and counterbalances to
the first amendment, the harm that this law recognizes meets a
higher standard than any of them have met or have been required
to meet, from the weakest to the strongest.
This is not a group libel law. There is a direct rather than
conjectured connection between the status and treatment of those
who could act under our law and the materials it covers. But,
however tenuously, group libel laws are constitutional. This is not
an obscenity law, but obscenity, on no showing of harm at all, is
considered not speech, hence unprotected by the first amendment.
This is not a libel law, either. It does recognize, however, that the
words themselves can constitute harm, and laws against both libel
and invasions of privacy are both only words and are constitutionally permitted, in some tension with the first amendment. Women
92. Ruth Colker shows the inadequacy of the current law of privacy in this context in her, Pornography And Privacy: Towards The Development Of A Group
Based Theory For Sex Based Intrusions Of Privacy, 1 Law & Inequality 191 (1983).
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are not children, but on the basis of an assumption that children in
pornography are there by force, and get hurt by being paraded
having sex in public, criminal bans on its production and distribution are constitutional. Our law does not strictly arise under any
prior recognized theory, but each of the theories I have mentioned
evidences concerns, sensitivities, and policies that provide the reason why the first amendment has been outweighed in each case.
Those same concerns, sensitivities, and policies, the civil rights approach shares.
To put it briefly, expressive values have been qualified when
the people hurt are real and when the interests matter: in the interests of unwilling viewers, captive audiences, young children, beleaguered neighborhoods (that means property values), for
comfort and convenience, and to avoid that recently discovered
atrocity, "visual blight."93 If speech interests can become comparatively less valued for constitutional purposes when the materials
are false, obscene, indecent, lewd, racist, provocative, dangerous,
coercive, threatening, intrusive, inconvenient, or inaesthetic, we
believe they should be able to be civilly actionable when they can
be proven to be coerced, assaultive, and discriminatory.
Coercion, force, assault, and trafficking are not ideas. Coercion is not a fantasy, force is not a representation, an assault is not
a symbol, and trafficking subordination is not advocacy. Pornography is at the center of a cycle of abuse that cannot be reached or
stopped without reaching and stopping the pornography that is its
incentive, product, stimulus, and realization.
So far, the courts that have looked at this law have found it
unconstitutional. Judge Sarah Evans Barker, accepting the findings of harm, found that most women seem able to avoid being coerced into pornography, and since it fits within no recognized
exception, it was not allowed.94 Perhaps most women can avoid
sexual harassment; perhaps most people can even avoid murder.
There are still laws against them. Judge Frank Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. He, too, accepted that pornography does
harm, but said that the more harm, the more protection. "We,"
referent unspecified, must accept that harm as the price of the free
market of ideas, even if it leads to genocide.95
I used to think the Supreme Court case on this ordinance
would be the Plessy against Ferguson of the pornography issue:
93. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104
S. Ct. 2118, 2132 (1984). The legal argument made here is discussed and documented more fully in MacKinnon, supra note 61.

94. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
95. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).

1986]

PORNOGRAPHY

separate but equal is equal. 96 Now I think perhaps that was opti97
mistic. We may be facing something more like the Dred Scott of
this issue. The Plessy version would have been: it's fine to treat
women as inferior because really they are different. But we may
be facing a prior issue, the abolitionist issue, an institution under
which some people can be bought and sold, are not to be able to
sue for it, and that defines the meaning of their freedom under the
Constitution.98
The bottom line of all the resistance we encounter to this law
is that a lot of people, people who matter, enjoy pornography.
That is why they defend it. That is also why there is so much hysteria and distortion over the civil rights approach. The worry is
not that it would misfire, but that it would fire at all. The fear is,
it would work.
The fact that some people like pornography does not mean it
does not hurt other people. As in any instance of a conflict of
rights, the side you take is a choice. We know that so long as pornography exists as it does now, women and children will be used
and abused to make it, as they are now. And it will be used to
abuse them, as it is now. The question is, whether we are willing
to wait for each act of victimization that we know will occur to occur, relying on existing law to clean up after the pornographersone mind, one body, one devastated life at a time-and never notice the gender of the bodies, never notice that the victimization is
centrally actualized through pictures and words, and never notice
that we encounter the pornography in the attitudes of many of the
police, in the values underlying the laws, on our juries, in our
courts every time we try to prove that a woman has been hurt. It
tells us how much we are worth, that something few people have
much good to say about, is more important than we are.
I hope you will see our law in your court some day. I hope
you will see it in a real case in which a real woman who has been
hurt is fighting for her life against real pornographers who are
fighting to keep us all subjected in the name of freedom. And I
hope that you will recognize, if such a case comes before you, that
even in the law, something is sometimes done for the first time.
96. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
97. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
98. On February 24, 1986, true to this prediction, the United States Supreme
Court summarily affirmed the Seventh Circuit's opinion, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) on a
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) direct appeal, without argument, opinion, or citation-suggesting, inter alia, that power is not having to give reasons.

